9th Meeting of the OECS Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Kingstown, St. Vincent & the Grenadines

April 27, 2026

We gather at a time when the world is not simply changing but becoming less ordered, less predictable, and less forgiving of small states that are not clear about who they are and how they act. I have often described this condition as entropic: a drift toward disorder, where the structures that once anchored stability are weakening, and the assumptions that once guided our engagement with the world no longer hold.

For decades, small states like ours navigated a system that, while imperfect, offered a measure of predictability. Rules mattered. Institutions mediated power. There was space - sometimes narrow, but real - for small states to act, to negotiate, to secure outcomes that would otherwise be beyond our reach. That space has rapidly now contracted.

We are seeing a gradual but unmistakable shift toward a more transactional world. Power is being exercised more directly. Multilateralism is under strain. The capacity of global institutions to enforce norms is diminishing. And in that vacuum, the logic of “might is right” is reasserting itself - not always overtly, but often enough to reshape the operating environment in which we must function.

For small states, this is not an abstract concern. It is an immediate and practical challenge. Because when rules weaken, those with less power feel it first and feel it most.

We are already experiencing the effects of this shift across multiple fronts. The changing posture of major partners is creating pressures on our economies, on our mobility, on our access to development support. We see it in the tightening of immigration regimes, in the volatility of remittance flows, in the scrutiny of our economic instruments such as Citizenship by Investment programmes, and in the retreat from multilateral cooperation that once provided a measure of balance in the system.

At the same time, we are confronting structural vulnerabilities that have always existed but are now being exposed more sharply. It is manifested in our dependence on external energy sources, our food import bill, our exposure to climate shocks, and the fragility of our fiscal space. And layered onto this is the reality of regional instability, most starkly reflected in the situation in Haiti, whose humanitarian and security dimensions carry implications for us all.

These are not separate issues. They are interconnected expressions of a system in transition.

And so, the question before us is not how we respond to each issue in isolation, but how we position ourselves collectively in a world that is becoming more fragmented and more demanding.

At the heart of that positioning is the question of foreign policy - how we engage, with whom we engage, and on what terms we engage.

For the OECS, convergence of foreign policy is not a theoretical or academic exercise. It is not a matter of administrative convenience or diplomatic niceties. It is a highly consequential strategic imperative.

And more than that, it is a practical expression of something we must now fully embrace: the pooling of sovereignty.

There is sometimes an instinctive hesitation when we speak of pooling sovereignty, as if it implies a loss. But in the context in which we now operate, the opposite is true. Individually, our sovereignty is constrained by scale but collectively, it is strengthened by coherence.

When we act separately, we negotiate from positions of relative weakness. When we act together, we create weight. ​ And our economies treated as a single market carry even more empirical weight than we are fully aware of.

While Trinidad and Tobago’s exports are globally oriented - totalling approximately US$7.9–11.4 billion annually - its most consistent and structurally dependent regional market lies within the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).

Individually small, but collectively consequential, OECS member states import an estimated US$400–700 million in goods annually from Trinidad and Tobago, based on aggregated national trade data. For example, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines alone imported approximately US$79.4 million in 2024, with Trinidad consistently ranking among its top suppliers of fuel, food products, and manufactured goods.

Across the OECS, Trinidad and Tobago is typically a top 3–5 import partner, and in critical sectors - particularly refined petroleum, processed foods, and light manufactures - it is often the dominant supplier.

Within the Caribbean trade architecture, where intra-regional trade accounts for only 13–15% of total trade, Trinidad and Tobago is the principal exporting economy, and the OECS constitutes one of its largest and most stable clustered markets - comparable in scale to its major single-country CARICOM partners such as Jamaica (≈US$208M) and Barbados (≈US$183M).

The implication is clear: the OECS is not merely a collection of small markets, but a strategic demand bloc that underpins Trinidad and Tobago’s regional export economy - particularly for non-energy goods - while simultaneously relying on Trinidad for critical imports. This creates a relationship of asymmetric interdependence with latent collective leverage on the part of the OECS. What then are the opportunities to learn, leverage and build our collective strength to transform asymmetry to beneficial convergence?

Then, in the international arena, while we can win friends and influence people in far flung spaces, it is the pooling of our diplomatic and political weight that expands our room for manoeuvre.

Pooling sovereignty, in this sense, is not about diminishing national authority. It is about amplifying it through collective action.

This is the logic that must guide our deliberations today.

When we speak of diversifying partnerships, we are not simply seeking alternatives. We are seeking to reduce vulnerability. We are seeking to ensure that no single external relationship defines our options or constrains our choices. Engagement with Africa, with the European Union, with Asia - these are not opportunistic moves. They should be part of a deliberate strategy to widen our strategic space and rebalance our external relations.

When we examine global security developments and energy resilience, we must recognise that these are no longer sectoral concerns. Energy is now deeply geopolitical. Supply chains are instruments of influence. Resilience is not just about infrastructure; it is about independence of action. And for us, that independence can only be built regionally.

When we turn to the crises within our region - whether in Cuba or Haiti - we are reminded that instability does not respect borders. It moves, it spreads, it tests the limits of our systems. Our response, therefore, cannot be episodic or purely national. It must be grounded in coordinated regional strategy - one that balances solidarity with prudence, and principle with realism.

Perhaps nowhere is the logic of pooling sovereignty more clearly expressed than in the item before us on the restructuring of OECS missions and the establishment of a shared diplomatic platform. Our current diplomatic architecture has served us, but it is constrained - by fragmentation, by limited capacity, and by the absence of fully harmonised coordination mechanisms.

In a world where influence is increasingly exercised through networks, through alliances, through sustained presence in key spaces, we cannot afford to operate as disconnected nodes. We must become a system coherent, coordinated, and strategically aligned.

A shared diplomatic platform is not simply about efficiency. It is about presence. It is about voice. It is about ensuring that when the OECS speaks, it does so with clarity, consistency, and credibility.

The same principle applies to our approach to the Citizenship by Investment. These programmes are not merely revenue-generating instruments. They are embedded in our international reputation and our diplomatic standing. Any erosion of their credibility has implications far beyond economics. It affects how we are perceived, how we are engaged, and how we are treated within the system. That is why we have moved decisively towards a unified regulatory framework which is necessary to safeguard both our integrity and our leverage.

And when we consider the Free Movement of Persons, we are confronted with a different but equally important dimension of integration. Here, the challenge is not one of policy design but of implementation. The legal architecture exists. What remains is to ensure that it is experienced by our citizens in a way that reflects its intent which is seamless, dignified, hassle-free and consistent travel across the region.

Because ultimately, integration must be lived, not merely legislated.

Across all of these issues, one theme recurs with increasing urgency: the need for unity of will and unity of action.

We cannot approach these challenges as if coordination is sufficient because coordination of effort is very different from integration of effort. Coordination implies adjustment. Integration implies alignment.

And alignment is what this moment demands.

A persistent block is the perspective that as small states we “have no choices”. This view can be a paralysing one because we are not without agency. But that agency will only be realised if we exercise it deliberately, collectively, and with discipline.

If we remain fragmented, the world will act upon us. If we are coherent, we can act within it.

This is the choice before us.

It is not a dramatic choice. It is a practical one. It will be reflected in the decisions we take here - in how we align our foreign policy, how we structure our diplomatic presence, how we manage our economic instruments, and how we give real effect to the commitments we have already made to integration.

History will not record whether we met. It will record whether we aligned.

Let me end on a note that speaks not to policy, but to perspective.

We often remind ourselves that our Member States came into being through different historical journeys, shaped by different experiences, different relationships, different trajectories.

And that is true.

But it is equally true that today, our futures are intertwined.

As the saying goes: “We may have all come on different ships, but we’re in the same boat now.”

And if that is so, then we must also accept the responsibility that comes with it.

Because in a sea that is becoming more uncertain, more volatile, and more unforgiving, survival will not depend on the strength of any single vessel.

It will depend on how well we row together.

Or, to put it even more plainly:
​“A single broomstick breaks, but the bundle is strong.”

The question before us is whether we choose to be a collection of sticks or a bundle.

Thank you.